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A Theory of Dynamic Tariff and Quota Retaliation 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is a well-known result of the optimal tariff literature that free trade cannot be supported as Nash 
equilibrium of a static game (Johnson, 1953-54): If all countries follow free trade, it is optimal for any one 
large country to deviate by imposing the positive optimal tariff. Moreover, in the same framework it turns 
out that when import quotas are used as strategic instruments, autarky obtains (see Rodriguez, 1974 and 
Tower, 1975). This pessimistic view of the prospects of free trade is not quite born out in practice. On the 
contrary, the last decades have seen an unprecedented increase in trade alongside a gradual reduction of 
trade restrictions with the advent of such organizations as the WTO. The institutionalization of 
negotiations cannot be the only reason for this success story, because some countries have even been seen 
to unilaterally remove import restrictions, possibly in the hope that such a move will be reciprocated (see 
Furusawa and Kamihigashi, 2006).  
It is, therefore, natural to ask how dynamic considerations change the incentives of countries when 
considering trade restrictions. Introducing dynamics into a tariff retaliation game leads to a plethora of 
equilibria even in the relatively straight-forward case where the dynamic strategies are restricted to be 
Markov-perfect (see Furusawa and Kamihigashi, 2006). In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, strategies are 
allowed to depend only on the pay-off relevant state variables. Thereby, one rules out the possibility that 
players employ complex punishment strategies, which would allow us to support basically any pay off 
vector in some equilibrium for some discount factor. Still, even in the Markov-perfect case, it is difficult 
to find general results. For this reason, our paper focuses on the steady state of games where players 
employ Markov-perfect strategies. This slight change of perspective allows us to find surprisingly simple 
answers regarding the impact of dynamic considerations and straight-forward characterizations of all 
possible steady states.  
The principal result of this paper is that the effect of introducing dynamics crucially depends on 
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whether the policy instruments employed by the countries are strategic substitutes or complements 
irrespective of whether they are tariffs or quotas. If they are strategic complements, countries can expect 
that a reduction of their tariff will be reciprocated by their trading partners. Therefore, countries expect to 
be rewarded for lowering tariffs, once dynamic considerations are taken into account. We can show that 
with strategic complements, the steady state of an MPE always results in countries imposing lower tariffs 
than in the static Nash equilibrium. This result, whilst confirming the intuition of Furusawa and 
Kamihigashi (2006) about dynamic incentives for lowering tariffs, is still surprising because it is obtained 
in precisely that case, where the preferences are such that they could conceivably support retaliatory 
measures resulting in a trade war. Moreover, we find a limit result where free trade can be supported as an 
MPE. On the other hand, if tariffs are strategic substitutes, lowering one’s tariff will result in the other 
countries increasing theirs. So taking account of dynamics will deter countries from lowering tariffs. We 
find that in every steady state of an MPE with strategic substitutes, countries always have higher tariffs 
than in the static equilibrium. 
We are also able to employ our framework to the question of non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas 
implied by the results of Rodriguez (1974) and Tower (1975). Here, we show that once dynamic 
considerations are taken into account, the autarky result can be dismissed altogether. Instead, we show 
that an equivalence result holds: with complete patience, free trade can be supported irrespective of 
whether tariffs or quotas are the policy instruments.  
Our approach allows us to employ general utility functions as they are characteristic of the 
classical international trade literature, in that we only require them to satisfy local single crossing 
properties. For such utility functions we are able to prove general existence of stable steady states of 
Markov perfect equilibria on which we predicate general policy predictions. We are thus able to compare 
the dynamic steady-state outcomes to the static steady-state outcomes of the Johnson-Rodriguez-Tower 
theories of tariff and quota retaliation, thereby going considerably beyond this literature, using general 
utility functions instead of specific parametric forms, and, inter alia, are able to take account of the effects 
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of strategic considerations. 
In section 2 we set up a static tariff retaliation game. Section 3 introduces dynamics and discusses 
the solution. Section 3 also deals with the properties of the dynamic steady states, and provides the 
intuition that underlies our conclusion of pertinence to the tariff-retaliation game. Section 4 deals with 
quota retaliation. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Static Tariff Retaliation 
Suppose that the world is made up of two countries, home (h) and foreign (f). Country h is 
endowed with a fixed quantity of commodity 1 and country f has a fixed endowment of commodity 2. 
Each country’s preferences are given by the utility function of its country’s respective representative 
agent, namely, fhix ,xuu i2i1ii ,,)( == , where x ,x i2i1 are the quantities of good 1 and good 2 consumed 
in country i. Both countries must abide by their respective budget constraints. And, each country can 
impose an ad valorem tariff,  , , on its imported commodity. All tariff revenues are assumed to be 
returned lump-sum to the representative consumer.  We focus on the case where countries are symmetric 
up to a relabeling of the goods. This is important for avoiding the dependence of conclusions that are 
based on taste differences across countries, as is the tradition in both neo-classical and Heckscher-Ohlin 
trade theory. This enables us to characterize steady state Markov perfect strategies. 
Substituting )t  ,t(x jii1 and )t  ,t(x jii2  for country i we obtain the indirect utility function
)]t ,t(x ),t ,t(x[u ] t ,t[U jii2jii1ijii ≡ . For this indirect utility function, 0 < t]/t ,t[U jjii ∂∂ ]t [0,  t  ,t ji ∈∀
where t is the prohibitive tariff, which results in autarky. Since the optimal tariff must be positive at least 
in the case where the other country imposes no tariff at all, it follows that  0 > t0]/  ,t[U iii ∂∂ ]t [0,  t i ∈∀ . 
The best response correspondence ) (tr iji ≠   maps ]t [0,  into itself.  Given continuity of U in both its 
arguments, there exists at least one fixed point of this mapping which corresponds to a static Cournot-
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Nash equilibrium )t ,t( sfsh  of the static tariff retaliation game. Because the best response of i for tj=0, is 
strictly greater zero, any equilibrium is positively-valued.1 If in addition the best-response correspondence 
is either monotonically decreasing or changes from monotonically increasing to monotonically decreasing 
only once, it follows that this equilibrium is unique.  
In the case that utility functions are twice differentiable, we obtain reaction curves with the slope 
t/ U
tt/ U
 = 
td
)t(dr
2
hh
2
fhh
2
f
f
s
h
∂∂
∂∂∂
 . The case of positively-sloped reaction curves ( 0  tt/ U jii2 ≥∂∂∂ ), is referred 
to as being strategic complements, with negatively-sloped reaction curves ( 0  tt/ U jii2 ≤∂∂∂ ) the tariffs 
are referred to as being strategic substitutes. Note that tariffs cannot be strategic complements 
everywhere: A country's optimal reaction yields a positive tariff for tariffs of the other country just below 
the latter's choke-off level, t , and since symmetric reasoning shows that a country's optimal reaction 
yields a negative tariff for tariffs of the other country just beyond the choke-off level, it follows that the 
home and foreign tariffs are strategic substitutes exactly at the choke-off levels.  
 
3 The Dynamic Multi-Period Model 
Following Maskin and Tirole (1987), we set up an alternating move game where country h sets the 
tariff th in period s = 1, 3, 5, …. and country f sets the tariff tf in period s = 2, 4, 6, … . This implies that 
when country f moves at s = 2, the tariff set at s = 1 by country h is exogenously given, and similar for 
country h at s = 3. The infinite horizon dynamic problem for country h is of the form,  
 ])t ,t[ U(     fhhs
0=stth
δ∑
∞
∈
max
],0[
 
In order to establish a steady state for a model which potentially exhibits non-continuities, we only 
require that around the steady state tariffs either are strategic complements in which case the difference 
                                                          
1
 Moreover, it is trivially true that it is the best response of a country to set its tariff equal to zero when the other country sets its 
tariff at the prohibitive level, because in that case there is no international trade anyway: there can be no tariffs on imports or 
exports if there are no imports or exports. 
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,   −  

 ,  is nondecreasing in tf or they are strategic substitutes in which case the difference 
,   −  

 ,  is nonincreasing in tf. 2  Single-crossing property holds around the steady state.3, 4 
Basically, these conditions ensure that the best-response functions are non-decreasing (non-increasing). 
This ensures existence of an equilibrium point because by Tarski’s theorem, any order-preserving map 
has a fixed point. In the case of strategic complements the condition ensures that the game is 
supermodular (Topkis, 1979, Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). 
For solving the game we use Markov-perfect equilibrium as solution concept.5  Unlike the history-
dependent strategies that support the folk theorems for repeated games, Markov solutions allow no more 
dependence on past actions than is indicated by the payoff-relevant features of the game. Markov perfect 
equilibria of oligopoly games have been studied by Maskin and Tirole (1987) and Dana and Montrucchio 
(1986), both assuming differentiability of the objective functions. The latter show that multiple MPE’s are 
supported depending on the specification of reaction functions. However, all strategy profiles in an MPE 
converge to some steady state.  Furusawa and Kamihigashi (2006) study MPE of a tariff retaliation game 
in a simplified setting where the myopic best response is independent of the strategic choice of the 
opponent.  We provide the following theorem which makes no assumptions on differentiability and does 
not restrict dependence of the pay-off functions on the other agent’s choices: 
Theorem 1:  Assuming tariffs are strategic substitutes (strategic complements) around the steady state 
and that the single-crossing-property holds locally, the discounted, infinite-horizon, alternating-move 
tariff game has a stationary equilibrium consisting of a pair of negative-(positive)-monotonic lower 
(upper) semi-continuous reaction functions, rh and rf , mapping ]t [0,  into itself.  
For the proof of Theorem 1 and its Corollary see the Appendix. Note that we do not claim that a 
unique stationary equilibrium exists. The main difficulty which we need to address in the proof is that 
                                                          
2
 Due to a result by Veinott, increasing differences, continuity and supermodularity are preserved under summation and taking 
the point-wise limit of the sequence, if U fulfills those properties (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).  
3
 In the case where U is twice differentiable these conditions imply 0  tt/ U jii2 )(≤≥∂∂∂ for complements (substitutes). 
4
 These conditions have an ordinal interpretation. For a weakening, see Milgrom and Shannon (1994).  
5
 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
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even if the underlying objective functions are continuous, reaction functions need not be, due to the 
possible existence of multiple, separated optima.  This can happen to dynamic reaction functions even if 
the corresponding static reaction functions are continuous.  Despite these technical difficulties, it is easily 
shown that, whatever the initial tariff levels, increasing differences in the case of complements or 
decreasing differences in the case of substitutes imply that the two countries' tariffs will converge over 
time to some pair of steady-state tariff levels. 
Corollary: Starting from any initial tariff level tariffs converge monotonically for each country to some 
pair of steady-state tariffs ( t ,t *f*h ) such that )t(r  t *hf*f ∈  and )t(r  t *fh*h ∈ . There is always such a pair 
forming a strict steady state, in the sense that )t(r = t *h*f*f  and )t(r = t *fh*h , and to which the dynamics 
locally converge. 
 Note that from above reasoning it quickly follows that the retaliation process is order-preserving 
in the sense that if t  t 0101 ˆ≥  then t  t s1s1 ˆ≥  for all time periods s.  This is regardless of whether the two initial 
points lead to the same steady state or not.  Note that no continuity properties were needed to prove the 
existence of a steady state. 
Plugging the opponent’s dynamic reaction functions into the objective function of h, the 
maximization problem at time s = 0 assumes the form 
)] t(r ,t[ UW     hfhhs
0=s
h
th
δ∑
∞
=max            (1). 
Assuming differentiability at the steady state, 6 the first order conditions for problem (1) require 
that, given th , t f  be chosen such that  
0= 
dt
)t(dr
 })]]t(r[r ),t(r[U
t
 + ]t ),t(r[U
t
{ + ]t ),t(r[U
t
 +]t ,t[U
t h
hf
hfhhfh
f
2
hhff
f
hhfh
h
fhh
h ∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂ δδδ     (2). 
If at the steady state, the countries’ tariffs are strict strategic substitutes, that is if reaction curves 
                                                          
6
 In the case where U is not differentiable at the steady state, we can use Gaussian curvature to determine the slope of the 
objective function in which case our result generalizes to non-differentiable objective functions. 
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are strictly monotonically decreasing (i.e. 0 < td/)t(dr hhf
 
), the indirect intertemporal effect of 
increasing one’s tariff is an indirect strategic gain, since such an increase will cause the other country to 
lower its tariff in future periods which then redounds to one's benefit (since 0 < t/ U fh ∂∂ ). If, on the 
other hand, the countries’ tariffs are strict strategic complements ( 0  td/)t(dr hhf > ), increasing one’s 
tariff results in an intertemporal loss because it expects an increase in the other country’s tariff which 
reduces its own benefit. Only in the case, where the other country does not react does the intertemporal 
effect of one’s tariff choice vanish.  From (2) we can derive a relationship between the short run MRS and 
its dynamic counterpart: 
 
Lemma 1:  Let 

∗
, 
∗ be the dynamic steady state. If tariffs are strategic complements in ∗, 
∗
, 
the indifference contour of the short-term problem must increase, or  > 0. If tariffs are strategic 
substitutes,  < 0. 
Proof: Follows immediately from the observation, that in 
∗
, 
∗ equation (2) must hold for 
either country, each country’s utility is decreasing in its opponent’s tariff and  

 > (<) 0 in the case of 
strategic complements (substitutes). ♦ 
The intuition behind the lemma is that in a steady state, where a country expects to win from 
lowering its tariff, there must be an off-setting short-run gain for it to be compatible with equilibrium. 
 
3.1 Static versus Dynamic Equilibrium 
 An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is the following proposition. 
Proposition 1:  If the preferences of both countries exhibit patience (δ > 0), any symmetric dynamic 
steady state when tariffs are strict strategic complements (substitutes) must occur in the region below 
(above) the myopic equilibrium, where both countries charge a lower (higher) tariff.  As a consequence, 
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both countries will be better off (worse off) in the dynamic steady state than in the static equilibrium. 
Proof: Let MRSs be the slope of the indifference curve in the static game. Because in the static 
equilibrium, short term reaction curves intersect, it must be that in the static equilibrium, 

∗
, 
∗, 


= 0 from the best response property and, hence, MRSs=0.  
Suppose that tariffs are strategic complements and short term reaction curves are upward sloping 
in 
∗
= 
∗
. We have to show that in a dynamic equilibrium, for ′, ′ < 
∗
, 
∗, 
the indifference contour is non-decreasing. To see this, construct in Figure 1 the point 
′,  on the 
home country’s static reaction curve 
 through 

∗
, 
∗. 7 Because ′ is a best response to , it 
must be that 
 ,  ≥  ,    for some  < ′. Now consider  ′, ′ located on the 450-line 
and, hence, vertically above 
 , . Say the intersecting indifference contour is decreasing in  ′, ′. 
In that case the two countries must be indifferent between 
, ′′ and 
′, ′ , with  > ′. Hence, 
U(
, ′ > U( , ′. However, recalling that 
′,  ≥  ,   this implies that the 
difference  ,  −  
,  is decreasing in , contradicting the condition of non-decreasing 
differences. Similarly, it can be shown that in the region above 

∗
, 
∗, the short term indifference 
contour must be non-increasing at the point of intersection with the 450-line.  
From Lemma 1, we know that in the case of strategic complements, the short term MRS must be 
positive at an equilibrium point, hence an equilibrium in the case of strategic complements can occur only 
in the region below 

∗
, 
∗. It is straightforward to prove that for strategic substitutes any equilibrium 
point must lie in the region above 

∗
, 
∗ ♦ 
From this result, dynamic considerations in a stationary MPE in a world where tariffs are strategic 
                                                          
7
 Note that the assumption that the static reaction curve is positively sloped is not necessary for our argument. The reaction 
curve may also be negatively sloped. If differences are non-decreasing (similar for non-increasing), it can be shown that 
starting with a point where h and f employ a greater tariff than their greatest best-response to equilibrium play, then there exists 
a monotone decreasing sequence converging at the equilibrium point (see Vives, 1990 and Topkis, 1979). Hence, at the steady 
state the reaction curve cannot be positively sloped with a slope exceeding one. 
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substitutes always result in higher tariffs than in the static equilibrium. If the world is one of strategic 
complements, it results in lower tariffs.  
 
 
Figure 1: Proof of Proposition 1 
Only in the case where intertemporal effects on the opponent’s policy choices vanish can playing 
the myopic equilibrium strategies be a stationary MPE. This confirms results obtained by Furusawa and 
Kamihigashi who show that in the absence of such intertemporal effects, playing the myopic (Nash) 
equilibrium strategies always can be supported as a stationary MPE.  
It is important to point out that only strategic complementarity (Johnson's "Scitovsky" case) 
captures ideas often implicit in the terms "tariff retaliation."  It is only in this case that one gets the 
intuitive result that the long-run deleterious consequences of a tariff war induce countries to rein back the 
competitive impulses that prevail in the short run. This is so since it is only in the case of strategic 
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complements that the individual long-run consequences of aggressive behavior are indeed deleterious, 
since it is only then that when one raises one's tariff will the other respond with a higher tariff, in the 
manner implicit in the term "retaliation."  In the case of strategic substitutes, on the other hand, the 
individual long-run incentives are instead to behave aggressively, since the other country will always 
respond in an accommodating fashion, though of course, in the manner of the prisoner's dilemma, the 
joint result of this individually rational aggression is liable to be harmful to both countries.  
 
3.2 Degree of Impatience 
In this subsection, we consider the properties of the dynamic steady states when the countries 
exhibit either complete impatience (myopia, where δ = 0), some patience (0 < δ < 1), or complete 
patience (δ = 1). As δ approaches zero and the countries become myopic, the dynamic problem 
approaches the static one. The same may be said of their respective first-order conditions.8 Also, as δ 
approaches zero, expression (3) indicates that the marginal rates of substitution of the two countries must 
also approach zero at the steady state if, as required by the stability of the reaction curves, they are not to 
become perfectly elastic in the limit.  This, of course, requires that, as δ approaches zero, the dynamic 
steady state reduces to the static Cournot equilibrium.  
It turns out that complete patience (δ = 1) is a necessary condition for free trade to be supported in 
the steady state of an MPE. At the state, )t ,t( *f*h , we can solve for the reaction curve of either country and 
obtain the following expression which relates the slope of the reaction curve of a country’s opponent to 
the slope of its own intermediate marginal rate of substitution MRSIM. This marginal rate of substitution 
represents the relative evaluation of tariff increases of h and f based on their consequences in the current 
and the next period: 
                                                          
8
 It is interesting, however, to observe the differences between the two cases in the expressions used to characterize the slopes 
of reaction functions.  In the dynamic case, the slope of the home-country reaction curve is obtained as a first-order expression 
in terms of the foreign country's utility, whereas in the static case, it is a second-order expression in terms of the home 
country's own utility. 
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For δ = 1, expression (3) collapses to  
 )t ,t( MRS= 
td
)t(rd *
f
*
h
s
f
f
fh
                 (4) 
Thus, in an equilibrium, a country chooses its policy such that the slope of its indifference curve is 
equated to the slope of the other country’s dynamic reaction curve 
". This is reminiscent of 
Stackelberg-behavior in a one-period model of oligopoly. The following proposition strengthens a similar 
result obtained by Furusawa/Kamihigashi (2006, Proposition 5). 
Proposition 2: Free trade can be supported as the steady state of an MPE if and only if both countries 
are perfectly patient (δ = 1). 
Proof: At a steady state it must be MRSIM = MRSs. In the free-trade equilibrium, the myopic 
indifference curves Uh and Uf must be tangential to one another because free trade is a Pareto-optimum. 
Hence, 1  MRS MRS sf
s
h == . 
To show the sufficiency part, suppose that δ=1 and that the free-trade point ),( ftffth tt
 
not a steady 
state. If tf=0, h’s best response must be to choose th > 0. Because we know that MPE-strategies converge 
to some steady state, after some finite length of time they must end up playing arbitrarily close to some 
steady state ),( ** fh tt  which is Pareto-inferior to ),( ftffth tt . 9 Because with δ=1, any gain from deviating is 
more than made up to by the long term loss from playing an inferior steady state infinitely often, a 
deviation reduces both player’s pay off. Hence, ),( ftffth tt  must maximize Wh and Wf. 
                                                          
9
 It is immediate that with δ > 1/2 only symmetric Nash equilibria can be supported as a steady state. Suppose that a steady 
state is asymmetric. In that case, the player with the lower pay off must benefit by choosing the strategy of the player with the 
higher pay off for whom it would be a best response to mimic the player with the lower pay off. Any short term loss from this 
change in strategy would be made up by the long run gain.  
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To see that δ = 1 is also necessary to support free-trade as a steady state, note that from the best 
response property of ri(tj) it must be that 0    MRS MRS dfdh ≤= . Because 1  MRS MRS sfsh == , (2) implies 
that the free-trade equilibrium can only be supported if 1≥ 
td
rd
h
f
. Hence, the reaction function must be 
increasing at the steady state.  By the stability condition, we can rule out 1> 
td
rd
h
f
. So suppose 1= 
td
rd
h
f
. 
Inserting δ < 1 and MRSIM=1 in the steady state condition (3) immediately results in a contradiction. ♦ 
In addition, we can rule out autarky as an outcome for δ > 0. By Proposition 1, it is sufficient to 
focus on the case where tariffs are strategic substitutes. Suppose one country's steady-state tariff is less 
than t . In that case, the other country would want to select a tariff below t . So suppose that both levy t . 
This can only be supported by perfectly inelastic reaction curves: otherwise the country that moves next 
will again depart toward trade. However, such reaction curves are not subgame perfect, because once a 
country deviated to a non-blocking tariff, it would be preferable for the other country to permit trade, 
rather than remain in autarky forever, resulting in higher pay offs for both. Hence we can conclude that 
 
Proposition 3: The dynamic steady state in a tariff war can never degenerate into autarky for non-myopic 
countries (with δ  > 0). 
 
4. Quota Retaliation 
In this section we consider a dynamic game where the two countries impose quotas instead of 
tariffs. Indeed, Rodriguez (1974) and Tower (1975) have used the same neoclassical two-country, two-
commodity international trade model to examine myopic quota games, rather than Johnson's (1953-54) 
myopic tariff game. They have shown that it makes little difference what combination of import or export 
quotas the countries employ: the equilibrium outcome is always that trade vanishes asymptotically.  We 
therefore explicitly consider only the case of export quotas, which provides perhaps the cleanest analysis. 
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The case of quotas can be analyzed in analogy to the case of tariffs.  For the analysis of this case 
we replace  
,  with  
#, # and it is understood that a quota of 1 corresponds to free trade and a 
quota of 0 corresponds to autarky.  
For simplicity, we consider the traditional case of well-behaved offer curves that are positively 
sloped and convex in the relevant range. In addition, we assume that a single-crossing property holds, i.e. 
that the game is supermodular. Note that despite this assumed regularity over consumption bundles, the 
binding nature of quotas implies that the induced preferences over quotas will not be quite so regular. In 
particular, there will be a non-smooth division into regions according to which quotas bind.  So while 
static reaction curves exist, they are not described by any first-order condition in terms of quota-induced 
preferences, but instead, along their relevant portion, are made up of the offer curves themselves, which 
serve to divide the various quota regions.  This follows since while the home country's utility in quotas 
rises in its own quota up to the point where the other country's quota binds, it falls thereafter.  The kink on 
the foreign country's quota-ridden offer curve is where this transition occurs, and so the foreign offer 
curve traces out the family of kinked optima that makes up the home country's reaction curve. Given that 
these offer curves are positively sloped up to the static optimal-tariff outcome, we have an unambiguous 
case of static strategic complements.  The only relevant intersection of the offer curves occurs at autarky, 
which is then the stable steady state of this myopic quota game. 
For analyzing the dynamic game, we can restrict our attention to the case where quotas are 
strategic complements. This case corresponds to the earlier trade war scenario where countries reciprocate 
an opening of the market of the other country by increasing their own quota. Note that in equation (2), 
increasing one’s quota now results in an intertemporal benefit if the other country’s reaction curve is 
positively sloped and it uses its quota to reciprocate. Hence, the short term   < 0 in  
#, #-space. 
Thus, the steady state quotas satisfying (2) must be found in the area above the static equilibrium values 

#
∗ , #
∗.  Hence, in the case of strategic complementarities, dynamic considerations take us nearer to 
 free trade, i.e. 
in Figure 2
In Figure 2
Cournot equilibrium,
asymptotically approached in a myopic qu
countries that have a positive degree of patience, meaning that 
quota retaliation game
OHX
any retaliation by the foreign country, with 
O
any retaliation by the home country, wi
 With the help of Figure
 
. 
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Proposition 4: If preferences of both countries exhibit patience (δ >0), the dynamic steady state of the 
relevant super-modular game must occur in the region above the myopic equilibrium where both 
countries allow greater quotas than in the static equilibrium. 
The following two propositions directly correspond to Propositions 2 and 3: 
Proposition 5: In a quota-retaliation policy game, free trade can only be supported in a stable steady 
state of an MPE if both countries exhibit complete patience (with δ = 1). 
However,  
Proposition 6: For countries that exhibit any positive degree of patience (δ >0), autarky cannot be a 
dynamic steady state of a quota-retaliation policy game, except in the extreme case of complete myopia 
(δ = 0). 
Proposition 6 yields a rather striking result: whilst in the static game, autarky is asymptotically 
obtained, the outcome of autarky can never arise as the steady state in a game in which dynamic 
considerations play a substantive role.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we seek to extend the neoclassical general equilibrium theory of tariff and quota 
retaliation beyond the work of Johnson, Rodriguez, and Tower. Their results pertain to either a static 
world or to a dynamic but completely myopic one. We introduce dynamics for non-myopic countries, and 
thus investigate the consequences of long-run strategic considerations in an internally consistent 
framework with fully rational countries. Our results pertain to the general equilibrium framework of 
traditional trade theory, where the full effects of policies are taken into account (see Neary (1988)). Like 
Johnson, Rodriguez and Tower, we assume that each economy is internally characterized by flawless 
perfect competition.10 In this framework, we investigate the pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria of an 
                                                          
10
 Instead of endowments of the two commodities in both countries, we could assume that each country’s production structure 
is characterized by its respective GDP function, $
%
1 +  , (, ) = ℎ, +, that is defined for a non-empty, compact and 
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alternating-move discounted infinite-horizon game, in the manner of Maskin and Tirole (1987, 1988a, 
1988b). However, we avoid specific parametric forms, and instead, follow the abstract traditions of 
neoclassical trade theory. Thus, rather than obtaining explicit solutions to particular parametrizations, we 
focus on qualitative properties of long-run, observable steady-state behavior, applicable to a large class of 
situations. We are thus able to compare the dynamic steady-state outcomes to the static steady-state 
outcomes of the Johnson-Rodriguez-Tower theories of tariff and quota retaliation, thereby going 
considerably beyond this literature, using general utility functions instead of specific parametric forms, 
and, inter alia, succeed in ascertaining the effects of strategic considerations in such contexts. 
 We find that Johnson's results for tariff wars require modification, the direction of which depends 
on whether tariffs act as strategic complements or substitutes. We observe that the orthodox case is that of 
strategic substitutes, but that the intuition suggested by the notion of tariff retaliation more closely 
corresponds to the case of strategic complements. It is only when reaction curves are upward sloping 
(strategic complementarity) that an opponent raises his tariff in response to an increase in one's tariff, as 
suggested by the term retaliation, and it is only in this case that long-run strategic considerations lessen 
short-run aggression. When rather than strategic complementarity, we have strategic substitutability, then 
the long-run incentives are instead to become more aggressive than in the short run, since the other 
country will be accommodating, given that it has a downward-sloping reaction curve. In the dynamic 
game, the result of the countries' combined aggression harms both countries in the manner of the 
prisoner’s dilemma.  
The cooperation resulting from strategically complementary tariffs or quotas is quite consistent 
with the taxonomy introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). Just as with the Scitovsky case of 
strategic complementarity in tariffs, dynamic considerations regarding quotas promote greater cooperation 
than in the myopic world, and thus yield greater welfare for both countries.  In the quota case, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
convex production set and constant returns to scale technology in the production of both commodities, where % is the relative 
price of a country’s imported good, ( is its factor endowment vector, and perfect competition prevails in both commodity and 
factor markets, and then the entire argument formulated here still holds.  
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this cooperation occurs through higher levels of action variables, rather than through lower ones, as 
occurs with tariffs.  This is due entirely to the fact that whereas higher tariffs of one country are bad from 
the point of view of the other, higher quotas of one country are, instead, good for the other.  In Fudenberg 
and Tirole's (1984) terminology, one has the "soft, strategic complement case", which calls for a "fat cat" 
strategy, where both countries drive up their choice variables (quotas) in order to deter competition. 
Whilst our results only modify Johnson's static steady-state predictions, the non-equivalence result 
of Rodriguez and Tower's is overturned completely once dynamic considerations are taken into account. 
Whilst in their static quota-retaliation game the autarky is asymptotically obtained, autarky cannot be 
supported in the steady state of an MPE in the regular case where the two countries' quotas are 
characterized by strategic complementarity. Moreover, the non-equivalence of the outcomes between 
retaliation by tariffs or by quotas is predicated on complete myopia. We reach the conclusion that the 
effect of introducing dynamics crucially depends on whether the policy instruments employed by the 
countries are strategic substitutes or complements irrespective of whether they are tariffs or quotas.  
Our canonical formulation of the issue – outcomes of retaliation by tariffs or by quotas – as non-
myopic dynamic games in Markov perfect strategies leads in the direction of equivalence, rather than non-
equivalence, especially when the countries exhibit greater patience. In addition, if countries exhibit 
complete patience, we obtain an equivalence result in the sense that free trade can be supported 
irrespective of whether tariffs or quotas are the policy instruments used by the countries. 
Much remains to be learned about international trade relations and the use of instruments of 
foreign trade policy. Voluntary export restraints, VERs, have gained prominence over time, and it would 
be good to know what a dynamic VER-retaliation game produces as the steady sate outcomes. For, arising 
from the quantity-constraint, the VER rents are lost by the country that receives a smaller amount of 
imports than under free trade. Another useful line of investigation would be to consider dynamic 
retaliation in a world of both international trade in commodities and in factors; Neary (1993) has done this 
for a world in which “the home country is relatively free to choose the values of trade and international 
18 
 
capital restrictions, whereas the foreign country responds passively without any retaliation” (p. 132). 
Retaliation with factor taxes and subsidies, especially on the internationally non-traded factors, if there are 
commodity import restrictions and other factors are internationally mobile would appear to be a promising 
line to pursue. If taste differences across countries are also deemed a matter of significance, the 
investigation needs to be of asymmetric countries rather than the symmetric ones examined here. Much 
work still remains to be done.      
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APPENDIX 
 
Theorem 1:  Assuming tariffs are strategic substitutes (strategic complements) around the steady state 
and that the single-crossing-property holds locally, the discounted, infinite-horizon, alternating-move 
tariff game has a stationary equilibrium consisting of a pair of negative-(positive)-monotonic lower 
(upper) semi-continuous reaction functions, rh and rf , mapping ]t [0,  into itself.   
 
Proof:11 The space of lower semi-continuous negative-monotonic functions is a compact metric space in 
the topology of weak convergence (Helly's theorem, e.g. in Parthasarathy (1967)), and hence complete.  
This constitutes the space of candidate dynamic reaction functions.  Consider the problem 






−
∞
∈
∑ ] t ,t[U  ssh2s
=s] t [0,  t s
1
1
ˆmax δ  
 
where 
[ ] [ ] [ ])t( ,tU + )t( ,tU t ,tU sfshsfshssh φδφ 11ˆ −− ≡  . 
 
Recall that countries move sequentially, each one at a time. Continuity of U h   and the assumed lower 
semi-continuity or φ f  assures U hˆ  is upper semi-continuous, given that U h   is negative-monotonic in its 
second argument.  One may therefore consider the contraction mapping 
 
 
( ) ( )f(t) +t]  [y,U  = y(Tf) h
t
δˆmax  , 
 
where ( )y(Tf)  M(y)≡   is upper semi-continuous, given that  f + U h δˆ  is itself upper semi- continuous for 
any upper semi-continuous real-valued function f  (see Ausubel and Deneckere (1993) for the 
appropriate generalization of Berge's maximum theorem). Thus, in the manner of Blackwell's theorem 
(see Stokey and Lucas (1989) ), T   maps from the complete metric space of upper semi-continuous 
functions into itself, and is a contraction with  a unique fixed point, the valuation function 
  
 
( ) ( ) . (t)V+t] [y,U  = yV hh
t
h δˆmax  
The reaction functions are  
 ( ) ( )(t)V +t]  [y,U   y hh
t
h argmax δˆˆ ≡Φ  
Say, strategic substitutability holds. Then  ( )yhΦˆ  is a negative-monotonic correspondence, in the sense 
that ( )y   t hΦ∈ ˆ  and y   y ≥′ implies t  t ≤′    for all ( )y  t h ′Φ∈′ ˆ , and since (y)hΦˆ  is upper hemi-continuous by 
the generalized Berge maximum theorem, it then follows that { }(y)   (y) hh Φ≡ ˆminˆφ   is a negative-
monotonic, lower semi-continuous function, that is, one with at most a countable number of 
                                                          
11
 Since, as remarked, similar proofs have appeared in the literature for related problems, we merely indicate the essential parts 
of the argument. 
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discontinuities and continuity from the right. 
 
The above procedure may be considered as a map F h   taking a candidate reaction function φ f  of 
the foreign country and yielding a candidate )(F= fhh φφˆ  for the home country, where the map F h   is 
seen to act continuously.  Repeating the procedure for the other country, form the map 
))(F ),(F(  ) ,( : hffhfh φφφφ →Ψ .  Since the space of lower semi-continuous negative-monotonic 
functions is compact and convex, and Ψ   maps this set continuously into itself, one may then apply 
Schauder's fixed point theorem (see Smart (1974)) to assure the existence of equilibrium reaction 
functions, rh   and r f  ,  where )r(F = r fhh   and )r(F = r hff .12  
Now consider the case where instruments are strategic complements in the myopic formulation of 
the model. If the single-crossing property holds, the game is supermodular (see Milgrom and Shannon, 
1994). If the static utility function U satisfies supermodularity, the dynamic objective function W also 
does (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, Theorem 11). For a supermodular game there exists a largest and 
smallest serially undominated strategies which are pure Nash (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, Theorem 5) 
and  ( )yhΦˆ is a monotone non-decreasing correspondence (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, Theorem 4), 
which follows from Topki’s montonicity theorem.  
 
Corollary: Starting from any initial tariff level of, say, the home country, tariffs converge monotonically 
for each country to some pair of steady-state tariffs ( t ,t *f*h ) such that )t(r  t *hf*f ∈  and )t(r  t *fh*h ∈ . There is 
always such a pair forming a strict steady state, in the sense that )t(r = t *h*f*f  and )t(r = t *fh*h , and to 
which the dynamics locally converge. 
 
Proof:  As observed by Dana and Montrucchio (1986, discussion of Theorem 3.1), the map rr fho   is non-
decreasing in both cases and so the dynamics converge to a limit t*h ,  which then must be a fixed point of 
the composite map in the sense that )t(r  t *fh*h ∈  for some t*f   such that )t(r  t *hf*f ∈ . The existence of a 
stable strict steady state follows from Tarski's theorem (see the discussion in Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1991)).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 In the above theorem we selected the lowermost value at each of the countable number of possible discontinuities of the 
resulting reaction function, in order that it indeed be a single-valued function, but for the purposes of the following argument 
we observe that the upper value of a discontinuity may be included as an equally valid reaction, since the underlying reaction 
correspondence Φˆ   is in fact upper hemi-continuous. 
